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The Coincidences of Time Travel*
Phil Dowe†‡
In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument
against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich
argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that
one of Smith’s objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive
way to defend Horwich’s argument against the second of Smith’s objections, but show
that it too fails. I conclude that unless there is something faulty in the conception of
explanation implicit in Horwich’s argument, time travel presents us with nothing that
is inexplicable.
1. Introduction. According to Paul Horwich (1995; 1987, chapter 7) even
if our universe had a spacetime structure containing a closed time-like
curve, on which we live, we still should not expect time travel into the
local past because that would involve improbable, inexplicable coinci-
dences such as those between attempts to shoot one’s grandfather and the
existence of factors which frustrate such attempts. Nick Smith (1997) re-
jects this claim for two reasons: first because arguments which derive time
traveling coincidences do so only because they assume similar coinci-
dences, and second given the de facto nature of the uniform lack of such
coincidences in our region of the universe, to expect no such coincidences
on the grounds that we haven’t seen any falls foul of problems of projec-
tibility (i.e., the generalization of correlations which hold in our experi-
ence). I argue (Section 4) that Smith is mistaken about the first point, but
(Section 5) right about the second. I consider a possible response on the
part of Horwich (Section 6), and show why that fails (Section 7). The
reason is particularly instructive, for I show that in fact the coincidences
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1. The terms “satisfactory” and “complete” are not intended to evoke comparisons with
accounts of explanation that use these terms is a semi-technical fashion.
2. Such a spacetime permits non-local time travel as well, of course. Horwich assumes
with most philosophers that such time-like curves would in theory allow time travel.
of time travel are not inexplicable in the relevant sense. I therefore con-
clude that if the account of the explanation of coincidences implicit in
Horwich’s argument—essentially a Reichenbachian account—is complete
then there is nothing about time travel that cannot be explained satisfac-
torily.1
2. Horwich’s Argument against Time-Travel. A common argument against
time-travel runs like this. If time travel is possible then contradictions of
the following sort are possible: you could shoot your grandfather before
your father was conceived, a state of affairs which entails both (1) that your
father was not conceived (because grandfather is dead) and (2) that your
father was conceived (because you are there) (Horwich 1987, 117). Horwich
rejects this argument on the grounds that it presumes that any causal chain
in an open timelike line can also be located on a closed timelike curve,
which is false: a causal chain must satisfy consistency conditions imposed
by its surroundings. (118–119) In fact time travel is possible, but if it occurs
then for whatever reason attempts to kill one’s grandfather will always
fail.
In its place Horwich offers the following argument:
Suppose [time travelers] try over and over again to commit autoin-
fanticide. On every attempt something happens to frustrate their
plans—guns are constantly jamming, poisons spilling, etc. but there
is no causal connection between decisions to commit autoinfanticide
and the guns’ jamming so often. Neither one causes the other, nor is
there any common cause. Thus Go¨delian time travel would imply
massive (indeed, limitlessly extendable) coincidence: a phenomenon
we know from experience to be absent from our world. We can infer,
therefore, that Go¨delian time travel will not take place. (Horwich
1995, 263)
Horwich’s argument is that since time travel into the local past will lead
to improbable coincidences, we should expect time travel into the local
past to be rare or non-existent (see also Horwich 1987, 93–99, 122–124).
Horwich argues further that if we are in a Go¨del spacetime (one kind of
spacetime that allows closed time-like curves), then, since Go¨del spacetime
permits time travel into the local past2, we would need to explain why time
travel is rare or non-existent. He claims that the reason may not be that
Go¨del spacetime is impossible, it may be for more mundane reasons, such
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as the fact that it would require more fuel than is technologically possible
(1987, 122). This wouldn’t rule out time travel into the nonlocal past,
where in fact such coincidences would not arise.
The crucial concept in Horwich’s argument, that of an ‘improbable
coincidence’, is explicated as a set of events with a certain statistical struc-
ture of a sort which we do not observe in our world. In fact Horwich
follows a roughly Reichenbachian program of explanation (Reichenbach
1956), as follows.
First, the Principle of V-Correlation (Horwich 1987, 97) states that if
there is a correlation between two events of types A, B respectively such
that
(i) P(A.B)  P(A)P(B)
then unless there is a direct causal connection between A and B
(ii) there is an event C which “screens off” the correlation, i.e., such
that P(A.B|C) P(A|C)P(B|C)
and
(iii) C occurs before A and B.
Here and throughout this paper such probabilities may be taken as relative
frequencies. A “direct” causal connection would be where A caused B or
vice versa; which, supposing causation to be transitive, entails that if A
causes C and C causes B, then A is a direct cause of B. Thus a direct causal
connection is in contradistinction to the kind of causal connection which
obtains between A and B in virtue of the fact that A and B have a common
cause or effect. (In other words, we do not mean “direct” in the alternative
sense of “has no intermediate causes.”)
The Principle of V-Correlation has the status of contingent fact, as a
matter of fact in our world it is extremely rare that correlations such as
(i) are screened off by a later event, unless there is also an earlier event,
which also screens it off. Patterns of events A, B, C which fit (i)—(ii) but
where C occurs after A and B must therefore be deemed “improbable”.
This is Horwich’s sense of “improbable” in his claim “time travel into the
local past will lead to improbable coincidences.”
Second, the Principle of Causal Correlation (Horwich 1987, 97) says
that correlations such as in (i) always admit of a causal explanation. For
example, what enables C to explain the correlation between A and B is
that C is the common cause of A and B. (Alternative possible causal ex-
planations of the correlation are that A causes B and that B causes A.) If
a correlation has no causal explanation it may be called “inexplicable”.
This would also make it a coincidence on one standard way of understand-
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3. This is perhaps a little misleading, just in that a variety of approaches to explanation
might deserve this label. However, I will persist with its usage because the account
Horwich gives indeed comes straight from Reichenbach.
ing that term (Owens 1992). We do not expect inexplicable coincidences
in our world, according to the Reichenbachian program.
For the purposes of this paper we shall make no assumptions about
what causation is, and therefore we cannot comment on the connection
between Horwich’s two principles. On some probabilistic theories of cau-
sation the past screening off event will be by definition the cause. Horwich
himself, who takes causation to be “basic nomological determination”,
says that the Principle of V-Correlation together with the Humean as-
sumption of priority (causes are earlier in time to their effects) gives the
Principle of Causal Correlation. However, we can leave this question
aside.
So, to summarise the Reichenbachian account of explanation: to ex-
plain a correlation between two events not explained by a direct causal
connection, one firstly looks for a past event which screens off the corre-
lation. One then must identify this event as the common cause of the two
correlated events to complete the explanation. Throughout this paper I
will use the label “Reichenbachian program”3 to refer to this approach.
For example, suppose a time traveler attempts to shoot his paternal
grandfather before the conception of his (the time traveler’s) father. Then
something will happen to prevent this—perhaps he slips on a banana skin
or his gun jams or some such thing. This can plausibly happen once, of
course, but it’s when we have numerous attempts at impossible events that
things seem particularly strange. Many repeated attempted grandpatricide
will involve inexplicable improbable coincidences, Horwich claims,
namely the correlation between such attempts (A) and the existence of
fortuitously placed banana skins (B) or the like. The set of events A, B
and C (the attempt fails) is an improbable coincidence, since although it
fits (i) and (ii), C, a common effect, occurs after A and B. Call a correlation
between A and B in such circumstances a “Horwich-coincidence”.
In Section 3 we turn to a detailed example, and in Sections 4 and 5 to
Smith’s objections to Horwich’s argument.
3. Sexual Cloning. In this section I will consider a detailed example which
will serve to illustrate some key points to be made later in the paper.
Suppose Adam travels back in time 30 years to 1970, where he meets his
mother Betty, mates with her and has a child which is himself. Is this
possible biologically? Yes, sexual cloning is biologically possible, as fol-
lows—if we may call this case “cloning” on the grounds that we have total
replication of Adam’s genome (Dowe and Evans unpublished).
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TABLE 1.
Genotype Phenotype Frequency
AA curly hair 25%
Aa wavy hair 50%
aa straight hair 25%
In sexual reproduction the father passes on to the offspring one allele
for every polymorphous gene site, the other being provided by the mother.
For simplicity suppose each gene site contains two alleles, one derived
from the father and one from the mother. To clone, the mother has to
give the offspring the other allele which the father had but didn’t pass on,
so that the son ends up with a set which is a completely identical to the
father’s.
For example, suppose there is a gene which determines how curly hair
is as follows:
Suppose Adam has the AA pair. Then, step one, Betty must have either
AA or Aa, with probability 75%. Say she has Aa. Then additionally, step
2, Betty must pass on her A in reproduction, probability 50%, so that
young Adam has the AA pair like his father.
If Adam then attempts to do something that didn’t happen, such as kill
baby Adam, his younger self, we will get a Horwich coincidence—some-
thing happens to prevent it. But we don’t need attempts to do the impos-
sible, or what doesn’t happen. There are remarkable coincidences in this
example without such attempts. For cloning to happen, two improbable
coincidences are necessary—first the mother must share with the father at
least one allele for every gene site, and second, the parents must pass on
the right allele at every site. The chance of both steps happening in our
example is 37.5%, but, of course for this to happen at every gene site is
very improbable. It has been calculated that for the human genome the
probability of the first step is 0.77530000; while the probability of the second
step is 0.520000 (Dowe and Evans unpublished).
So, in Adam’s case, let A be the fact that the reproducing father has
genome i and let B be that Betty has genome j, and such that i and j share
at least one allele at every gene site. Then condition (i) holds: P(A.B) 
P(A)P(B), since the frequency of this happening amongst male time trav-
elers who are in fact their own fathers is one, yet P(A)P(B)  0.77530000.
Condition (ii) also holds: P(A.B|C)  P(A|C)P(B|C), where C is the fact
of Adam being born with genome i. But C occurs after A and B, and there
is no event in the past of A and B which screens off (i). So we have a
Horwich coincidence.
Or let A be the fact that Adam supplies the set of alleles x and B the
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fact that Betty supplies set y. Then again, P(A.B)  1, but in this case
P(A)P(B) 0.520000. Again, P(A.B|C) P(A|C)P(B|C) where C is the fact
of Adam being born with genome i. In particular, if we suppose there are
large numbers of people traveling back in time to give birth to themselves,
we have a Horwich-coincidence without any attempt to do the impossible.
4. Do Coincidences Assume Coincidences? Nick Smith has provided a sus-
tained critique of Horwich’s argument (Smith 1997). In this section and
in Section 5 I shall consider two of Smith’s arguments, the first of which
I reject, but the second of which I think is valid. In Section 6 I will present
a proposal for boosting Horwich’s argument to avoid this latter argument,
but show in section 7 why this does not work.
First, Smith has argued, contra Horwich, that backward time travel
does not entail unusual numbers of coincidences:
. . . backward time travel, in itself, does not entail slips on banana
peels and other such coincidences. Rather, each argument which pur-
ports to derive such coincidences as output, given backward time
travel as input, also uses as input—in addition to backward time travel
itself—occurrences which are themselves as rare and apparently im-
probable as long strings of slips on banana peels . . . (Smith 1997,
381)
To get a correlation between attempts to kill grandfathers and the fortu-
itous existence of banana skins or the like, Smith claims one must assume
that there is a correlation between those with opportunity for time travel
into the local past (T) and those who would do what they know is impos-
sible (I). But what an amazing coincidence that such an unusually large
number of time travelers reason so fallaciously as to suppose they can do
the impossible! (Smith 1997, 381–382).
But Smith is mistaken. Suppose there is no correlation between I and
T, i.e., that a time traveler is no more likely to think she can do the im-
possible than is anyone else. So P(I.T)  P(I)P(T) and so P(I|T)  P(I).
Suppose P(I) 0.5. Then perhaps about half of all time travelers attempt
to do something like kill their grandfathers before their parents’ concep-
tion. Those attempts will be correlated with things like the fortuitous ex-
istence of banana skins in just the way Horwich envisages. Therefore you
do not need to assume correlations in order to derive correlations.
But perhaps Smith means that since P(I) is very low (there can’t be
many so crazy as to seriously contemplate doing the impossible), unless
there is a correlation between T and I, the chances of getting many at-
tempted grandfather killings is very small, as P(I|T) is very small. Then
local time travel may well be frequent, but that won’t mean there are many
improbable coincidences because there still won’t be very many attempts.
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To get the frequency of attempts necessary to “see” the correlation, you
would need a very large number of local time travelers indeed. Therefore
Horwich can at most conclude that there will not be a very large number
of local time travelers.
This argument assumes P(I|T) is very small. Smith perhaps thinks peo-
ple are unlikely to be so irrational. Horwich, on the other hand, thinks it
is likely people will be curious enough to want to try such things. I will
not attempt to adjudicate on these psychological theses. However we
should note that we must not confuse Smith’s thesis with the psychological
thesis that few would want to kill their grandfathers. “A” could just as
well be cases of attempts to help one’s young grandparents win a lottery
they didn’t win.
In any case, as we saw in Section 3, there can be Horwich-coincidences
even when people don’t attempt to do the impossible. Sexual cloning in-
volved two such coincidences. To give another example, suppose a time
traveler meets her grandparents, shakes their hands, but doesn’t tell them
who she is. Then some strange things might happen. Grandfather goes to
war as a young man, as yet unmarried, and every time enemies sees him
and attempts to shoot, they slip on a banana skin or something. Meeting
the time traveling relative (A) is correlated with the existence of such ba-
nana skins or the like (B) and is screened off by the attempt’s failure (C)
according to (i) and (ii), but C occurs after A and B.
So, in general, the Horwich-coincidences that we saw are associated
with causal loops such as Adam giving birth to himself do not require
Smith-type correlations to get them going. Smith’s argument that to derive
an improbable correlation you need to assume an improbable correlation
seems to be mistaken, so Horwich’s argument withstands this criticism.
However, Smith has a second argument, which I believe does tell against
Horwich’s argument.
5. Are Improbable Coincidences to Be Expected? According to Horwich
the fact that we don’t see cases where C occurs after A and B (given the
statistical correlations in (i) and (ii)), and that time travel would lead to
that sort of scenario, is reason enough to expect that time travel into the
local past will not occur very often. We should expect that such cases will
continue to be absent to just the extent that they have been in our expe-
rience.
First, it’s worth asking whether it is possible that we have the “im-
probable” correlations already, because in that case the correlations time
travel would bring couldn’t even be called “improbable”. We think we do
not have the relevant correlations, and so in that sense we do not see them.
But is it possible that such exist without our knowledge? We need to ask
whether we know on the grounds that we haven’t seen them that there
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haven’t been time traveler-induced correlations in our experience. In the
case of the correlation between attempts to kill grandfathers and slips on
banana skins, the correlation is only “visible” because we have partitioned
on the fact that he is a time traveler. If we just take attempted shootings
in general, we won’t expect a correlation with banana skins. But if un-
known to us there were time travelers in our midst, sometimes attempting
grandfather shootings, then there would be a correlation between attempts
in general and bananas or the like. But unless there were extremely high
incidences of time travelers, the effect would be slight, so we probably
wouldn’t notice it. Without independent evidence of time traveling, we
wouldn’t notice the correlations it brought. Then it may be that such cor-
relations do already occur, and if so they cannot be called improbable in
Horwich’s sense.
But let’s grant that the correlations are improbable in the way that
Horwich says. We can show that this is not grounds for expecting that
time travel to the local past will be at best rare.
The argument is due, again, to Nick Smith (1997, Sec. 4). The fact that
the “improbable” structures are rare and the “probable” structures are
common is a mere de facto feature of our region of the world, which is to
say it has the status of accidental regularity rather than law of nature. If
time travel to the local past were common, then such correlations wouldn’t
be improbable, they would be a common feature of the world. Even if
such regularities can be expected to continue under relevantly similar con-
ditions, there will be no grounds for expecting them to in relevantly dif-
ferent contexts. The relevant difference in our case, Smith argues, is simply
that there is time travel. We have good reason to think there are no visitors
from the future among us at the moment. The question is, should that fact
alone make us think that they will not begin to arrive? No, if such visitors
should begin to arrive, it’s reasonable to think that we might see kinds of
effects that we are not accustomed to seeing. So Horwich seems open to
a problem of projectibility, namely that he assumes that we can project
features of our experience onto another region when that region may be
relevantly different to ours.
It seems that Smith is right—we should indeed expect a world of time
travelers to be relevantly different. The following two soups example
makes this clear. Suppose that John has a rare disease spread by sneezing,
and that as he cooks some soup he unwittingly sneezes on it. Suppose he
puts the soup into two sealed vacuum flasks, and sends them via separate
time ships back to the days of his parents’ childhood. Suppose one flask
is sent to his mother, the other to his father, before they ever met, such
that there is no contact between the two missions. Suppose both parents
catch the disease from the eating the soup. It seems obvious that John’s
sneezing on the soup is the common cause of the fact that his mother and
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father both catch the disease. This correlation—that a couple who are to
marry both catch the same rare disease—is improbable in Horwich’s sense.
We have two correlated events which are screened off only by a future
event, in violation of the Principle of V-Correlation.
Intuitively, it would seem clear that we should not rule out time travel
on the grounds that it almost certainly will involve correlations of this
sort. This is exactly the kind of correlation that we would expect if there
were time travel, and to rule it out is simply to beg the question against
time travel.
Thus the Reichenbachian program of explanation needs to be modified
if it is to account for causal explanation in a world involving time travel.
As we might have expected, the priority condition in the Principle of
V-Correlation needs to be dropped. According to the Modified Reichen-
bachian program, to explain a correlation between two events not ex-
plained by a direct causal connection, one firstly looks for an event past
or future which screens off the correlation. One then must identify this
event as the common cause of the two correlated events to complete the
explanation.
A further problem worth noting is that Horwich’s argument seems to
rule out time travel to any past, and not just the local past. Recall that
according to Horwich the coincidences will only arise if there is travel to
the local past, while travel to a remote past will not involve such coinci-
dences since there is no possibility there of causal loops. It’s true that
remote time travel does not allow for causal loops or for attempting to do
the impossible, but it’s not true that there would be no improbable sets of
events. For suppose John sends his soup back in time to living beings
unrelated to those on earth, and on other sides of the universe respectively.
If living beings F and M are the ones who catch the disease, then their
both catching it is explained by John and his sneeze. Again we have an
improbable correlation, explained by the future common cause. So Hor-
wich’s claim that his argument applies only to time travel into the local
past is wrong, and hence so also is his explanation of why time travel into
the local past won’t occur in Go¨del universes.
We can conclude on the strength of these arguments that Horwich’s
claim is fallacious that time travel to the local past is not to be expected
on account of the improbability of the coincidences it would involve.
6. Improbable versus Inexplicable Correlations. But perhaps we have not
done justice to Horwich’s argument. This suspicion arises because the two
soups case, which is explicable if improbable, seems less problematic than
the kind of Horwich coincidences on which Horwich’s argument is based.
Perhaps he intends to argue that it is on account of their inexplicability
that these correlations tell us that there won’t be time travel into the local
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Figure 1. Probable (left two) and improbable (right two) structures.
past. To see the difference this makes, we need to look a little more care-
fully at the distinction between improbable and inexplicable correlations.
Recall that Horwich’s sense of “improbable” as opposed to probable
refers to sets of events which are rare or non-existent, as opposed to sets
which are common. Figure 1 shows some structures of events which are
probable and some which are improbable, where A, B and C fit relations
(i) and (ii) in Section 2 (i.e., C screens off a correlation between A and B).
Probable structures include cases where correlations are screened off
by an event in the past, or by an event occurring between the times of A
and B. Improbable, or extremely rare structures include the cases in which
correlations are screened off by an event in the future, and not also by
one in the past.
By “inexplicable coincidence” Horwich means a correlation which has
no causal explanation (1987, 93–4). This in itself makes no reference to
time. Indeed the Principle of Causal Correlation (all correlations have
causal explanations) does not by itself demand that correlations are ex-
plained by a past event. That demand only arises when one also brings in
the Principle of V-Correlation, in particular clause (iii), or a theory of
causation according to which effects do not precede their causes.
For example, a correlation which has a common cause, either in the
past or the future, is explicable, whereas one that has only a joint effect,
either in the past or the future, is inexplicable. Figure 2 depicts some
explicable correlations, Figure 3 some inexplicable ones, again where in
both cases A, B, C are related according to (i) and (ii). Standard cases of
explanation by a common cause are represented by 2(i), Horwich’s time
traveling coincidences are represented by 3(i), while the two soups case is
represented by 2(iii).
So one way of expressing the Reichenbachian program is that to explain
a correlation we first identify a past event that stands in the appropriate
statistical relation, and second make sure the causal connections point the
right way (on the Modified program we drop the word “past”).
Notice that there can be probable inexplicable, and improbable expli-
cable correlations. In Figure 2 (ii) and (iii) are improbable and (i) and (iv)
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A
AA
A
A
AB
BB
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
CC
(i) (ii) (iii)
(vi)(iv) (v)
Figure 2. An AB correlation is explicable if it has a causal explanation of one of these
forms.
A
A
A
B
B BC
C
C
(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 3. An AB correlation is inexplicable if the only relevant causal connections are of
one of these forms.
are probable, while in Figure 3 (i) is improbable and (ii) and (iii) are
probable. In fact, Horwich himself points out that not all inexplicable
correlations are improbable (1987, chapter 6, section 3). If A and B have
a joint effect C which occurs after A but before B (and there is no other
event which screens off the correlation between A and B), then this is not
an improbable structure of events, although it is inexplicable since nothing
causes the correlation (Figure 3(iii)). Horwich calls this “non-humean”
causation, apparently because the B-C causal relation violates Hume’s
priority condition for causation.
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BA
C
S
D
(i)
(ii)
B          C          S          D          A
Figure 4. The explicability of Horwich-coincidences represented (i) in spacetime and
(ii) schematically.
Some of these possible structures were disallowed by Reichenbach, be-
cause he held that all causal processes connected in a single net had the
same direction (see Dowe 1996). However, Horwich doesn’t have this re-
striction; as we have just seen, he has Figure 3(iii) as his example of a
probable but inexplicable, “non-humean” structure.
Our new version of Horwich’s argument can be expressed in terms of
these diagrams: time travel into the local past should not be expected even
in a world with closed timelike curves because it would involve causal
structures of the form in Figure 3(i), which are both inexplicable and im-
probable. The two soups case given in the previous section—the son’s
sneeze being the common cause of his young parents each getting the
disease—is a case of an explicable, but improbable correlation (Figure
2(iii)). That may explain our intuition that this is just what we would
expect if time travel into the local past occurred. However, we may feel,
the kind of correlation Horwich has in mind is an inexplicable improbable
correlation, and the intuition is not so clear here.
So, if as we are supposing in this section, Horwich means to rule out
local time travel on account of the improbability and inexplicability that
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4. In some sense of cause or a related concept, see Dowe 2001.
5. Smith has a nice discussion concerning which counterfactuals we take to be true
under time travel (1997, section 4).
it entails, and the correlations he has in mind are both inexplicable and
improbable, then perhaps the argument of the previous section is not to
the point. In the next section, however, we will see that the kind of cor-
relations Horwich has in mind are after all explicable, so the argument of
the previous section is to the point after all.
7. Does Time Travel Entail Inexplicable Coincidences? Consider again the
correlation between attempts (A) to kill one’s grandfather before one’s
father’s conception, and the fortuitous existence of banana skins or the
like (B). There is a strong correlation between A and B, viz., P(B|A) 1,
yet without time travel there would be no correlation between attempts to
kill people and banana skins. Thus P(A.B)  P(A)P(B). This correlation
is screened off by C, the later fact that the attempt fails.
To recap Horwich’s argument: A doesn’t cause B, and there’s no com-
mon cause in the past of A and B which screens off the correlation. There-
fore this is an improbable, inexplicable correlation. This looks like the
usual kind of Horwich-coincidence, screening off by a common effect.
However, and this is the key point, the Principle of V-Correlation only
says there is a past screener-off in cases where there is no direct causal
connection between A and B. Recall that by direct cause we mean that A
causes B rather than that A and B have a common cause. (Again, we do
not mean “direct” in the sense of “has no intermediate causes”.) But there
is a direct causal chain in our Horwich-coincidence case—B is part of the
causal history of A! Take the chain B-C-S-D-A, where S is grandfather’s
survival, and D is the grandson’s decision to travel back in time. There is
a direct causal connection between B and A, via this chain, as follows.
There is no doubt that the banana skin was one of the causes of the killer’s
slipping. There is no doubt that the killer’s slipping was one of the causes
of the grandfather’s surviving that day. There is no doubt that the grand-
father’s surviving that day was one of the causes of the grandson’s ever
being there to make the decision to go back in time. And there is no
doubt that the grandson’s making the decision to go back in time was
one of the causes of the attempt to kill. In other words, B causes C, C
causes S4, S causes D, and D causes A. So there is causal chain between
B and A, so assuming the (largely non-controversial) transitivity of cau-
sation, B causes A. B is therefore a cause of A according to at least some
theories of causation. According to the counterfactual theory it is, since
A counterfactually depends on B (if we grant semantics appropriate to
time travel) since had B not occurred, A would not have occurred.5 Ac-
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6. Thus B causes A in a stronger sense than just to say that the two events are attached
to an extended causal process.
7. For example, suppose in the year 2000 Paul has the intention to become a time-
traveler and to go back and kill himself. In the year 2002 he begins the time trip, and
on his arrival back in the year 2001 he attempts to kill his younger self, but slips on
a banana skin. Then there is an unexplained coincidence between his 2000 intention
and the 2001 banana skin.
cording to the process theory it is, since B and A are also linked by a string
of causal processes and interactions, viz. the slip on the banana skin,
grandfather’s existence from S on, father’s birth, father’s existence, time
traveler’s life, including the time trip, and ending with A.
This is intuitively what we would expect if this string of events were
laid out forwards in time. Suppose someone attempts to shoot Hitler’s
grandfather before his father’s conception, but that due to a fortuitous
banana skin (B) the attempt failed (C). Consequently Hitler’s grandfather
survived that day (S), and consequently years later Hitler was in a position
to decide to shoot some innocent person. This decision leads to an attempt
(A) to kill the victim. It seems reasonable, providing one believes in causal
transitivity, to say that the banana skin (B) was a (partial, remote) cause
of Hitler’s attempt (A) to shoot the victim. So also in the time traveling
case: B causes A.6
So the AB correlation is explicable, although improbable, according to
the Reichenbachian program. It is represented crudely in Figure 2(ii). (I
am not claiming that there are no conceivable structures that can occur
with time travel and which constitute inexplicable, improbable correla-
tions, just that the sort that Horwich is appealing to are not generally of
that sort.7) B causes A in the same way that without time travel a banana
skin might cause a gunman to slip, preventing a death which enabled a
birth which enabled an offspring to attempt to shoot someone.
For example, take the case of time traveling Adam, who mates with his
mother Betty and has a child who is himself, a clone. The first improba-
bility that we considered was that Adam and Betty should share at least
one allele at every gene site, which, when taking a partner at random, is
prohibitively improbable. We noted in Section 3 that the correlation is
screened off by the fact that young Adam is born with the particular
genome that he is. But really there is nothing unexplained at this point.
Adam and Betty must share one allele at every gene site, because Betty is
Adam’s mother. Anyone who commits this kind of incest will overcome
that improbability.
Since the correlation is therefore explicable according to the Modified
Reichenbachian program, it cannot be claimed that it is on account of
both their improbability and inexplicability together that such correlations
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rule out time travel to the local past. It can only be on account of their
improbability, so the objection of Section 5 still stands.
8. Conclusion. According to the Modified Reichenbachian program of ex-
planation a correlation is explained if it reflects a direct causal relation or
if it can be shown to be screened off by a common cause. The unmodified
program further insists that the common cause is in the past of its joint
effects, on the strength of the fact that de facto this is what always happens.
However, entertaining the possibility of backwards causation seems to
be tantamount to entertaining the possibility that an event has past effects
which are correlated, and which it screens off. So to say that time travel
into the local past is improbable seems to say no more than since we
haven’t yet seen any, there won’t be any (Section 4).
Time travel does seem to entail Horwich-coincidences, but these admit
a straightforward causal explanation: there is a direct causal connection
not via anything approximating the shortest spacetime path between the
two events, but via a causal chain which extends forward into the future
then back into the past (Section 7). If the Modified Reichenbachian pro-
gram is accepted, and there is no more to causal explanation than finding
the right kind of set of events related by the right kind of probability and
causal relations, then the Horwich-correlations are adequately explained.
Alternatively, if we find that there is something unusual, still requiring
explanation, in cases of Horwich correlations then perhaps we should pre-
fer to conclude that the Modified Reichenbachian program for the expla-
nation of coincidences is incomplete. Nothing I have said rules this out.
For example, some may find that the fact that young Adam has the
genome he does (C) does not adequately explain the fact that he passes
on exactly the right genes that complement the genes his mother gave in
reproduction (A). It is true that A is certain given C, they may feel, but
that doesn’t tell us how C brings about A, something that is inexplicable
on current biological knowledge. The advantage of the example in Section
3, such people may point out, is that one coincidence is nicely explained
(why Adam and Betty have the right genes to allow cloning), but the other
(why Adam passes on exactly the right genes) is not. The problem, they
may argue, is that you may well have probability raising between C and
A, both may be part of a single causal process, and the direction of cau-
sation may be from C to A, but this does not guarantee that C actually is
a cause of A, despite what the Reichenbachian program may say. There-
fore the Reichenbachian program needs supplementing, at best, to handle
time travel cases.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter that debate. Instead the
conclusion here can be expressed as a disjunction. Either the modified
Reichenbachian program is complete and there is nothing remaining to
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be explained about time travel, or since there is something about time
travel which the Modified Reichenbachian program does not explain, it
cannot be complete.
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